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BAR BRIEFS
find anything to the contrary in the Nebraska case (General
Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Hupfer, supra). In that case
only the so-called trust receipt was under the consideration of
the court. No promissory note attended the receipt in that
case."
It would seem that from the growth of cases the courts
are beginning to place the trust receipt in the category of a
conditional sale or chattel mortgage in order that they be re-
corded to protect the rights of bona fide purchasers. Motor
Banker's Corporation v. C. I. T. Corporation, supra; Burroughs
Adding Machine Co. v. Wieselberg, 230 Mich., 15, 203 N. W. 160
(1925); Nelson v. Viergiver, 230 Mich. 38, 203 N. W. 164 (1925).
"The question in this case is how far a serviceable nag may
be ridden, or, less metaphorically, may the so-called 'trust re-
ceipt,' highly useful in certain kinds of commercial transactions,
and which the courts have in consequence struggled to sus-
tain, in spite of its apparent conflict with recording laws, be
upheld when the principal, if not the sole, reason for resorting
to it, is to escape from those very statutes." In re Cullen, 282
Fed. 902 (Md. 1922). Although most courts will enforce the
trust receipt as to the original parties it is the intervention of a
third party that causes the confusion. In our case there is no
bona fide purchaser or creditor of the buyer concerned so the home
court has as yet not put a definite label on this so-called trust re-
ceipt. Nevertheless, because of the conflicting law among the
states, the uncertain law within the states, the highly complex
and technical practice, a field steadily increasing in importance
since 1880 and a field in which the trust receipt device performs
a legitimate and needed function, and in which certainty and uni-
formity are badly needed, - the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws adopted in 1933 the Uniform
Trust Receipt Act which has since been adopted in California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Tennessee. 9 U. L. A. '39
pp. 239, 241. Our conclusion in view of these decisions and
statutes is that if we are to be in accord with the increasing mod-
ern trend should we not treat these commercial instruments as
conditional sales or chattel mortgages and require that they be
recorded? Or better still-adopt the Uniform Trust Receipt Act
which requires that trust receipts be recorded.
ROY A. NESTE,
Third Year Law Student
University of North Dakota.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In E. B. Isakson, Plft. and Applt., v. State of North Dakota and John Gray,
State Tax Commissioner;" Defts. and Respts.
That Chapter 249, Session Laws of North Dakota, 1937, as amended by
Chapter 234, Session Laws of North Dakota, 1939, known as the Sales Tax
Act, exempts from the sales tax retail sales of alcoholic beverages specified
in the Liquor Control Act (an initiated measure approved November 5, 1936).
That the combining of nonalcoholic ingredients with alcoholic beverages
that have been taxed under the Liquor Control Act, to form what are com-
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monly known as "mixed drinks", does not amount to incorporating the non-
alcoholic ingredients in or attaching them to tax exempt property within the
meaning of section 1, subsection (c) of the Sales Tax Act.
That the exemption by the Sales Tax Act of the sale of alcoholic bever-
ages specified in the Liquor Control Act does not follow those beverages after
they have become ingredients of some other commodity, nor do such bever-
ages impart exemption to the entire commodity of which they become in-
gredients.
That the complaint in this action which seeks to recover taxes paid under
protest upon nonalcoholic contents of mixed drinks sold at retail is examined
and held not to state a cause of action.
Appeal from an order sustaining demurrer from the District Court of
Burleigh County, Hon. Fred Jansonius, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Morris, J. Burke and Christianson, JJ. dissent.
In J. E. Sandlie, Respt., v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation
Bureau, et al., Applts.
That the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that the injury
from which he was suffering was received in the course of his employment,
before he is entitled to share in the Workmen's Compensation Fund.
That the evidence is examined and it is held, that for ten years or more
prior to the employment of the plaintiff, he was suffering from high blood
pressure; that the injury from which the plaintiff suffered was caused by
this high blood pressure; and the evidence fails to show that anything which
occurred in the course of his employment aggravated this condition so as to
entitle the plaintiff to share in the Workmen's Compensation Fund.
Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County,( Hon. M. J.
Englert, Judge.
REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, J.
In Augusta Gaschk, Peti., v. J. A. Kohler, Sheriff in and for Burleigh
County, North Dakota, Respt.
That where, in a contempt proceeding, the district court finds the accused
guilty of contempt in failing to make payments of money as required in an
order for payment and, without assessing a penalty of fine or imprisonment
because of such contempt, makes and enters a new order requiring the
accused to make payments in accordance with the terms prescribed in this
order and ordering that upon failure to do so, the accused be committed to
the county jail, the accused can not be so committed for failure to make the
payments at the time and in the manner required by this new order until
an opportunity be given to her to show she has complied with the order,
or has a valid excuse for noncompliance, and the court makes a subsequent
finding of disobedience, showing disobedience, and orders commitment.
That under the circumstances hereinbefore related, the clerk of the
district court has no authority to issue a commitment to the county jail
without an order of the court to that effect.
That the petitioner having applied to this court for a writ of habeas
corpus, and it being shown to this court that she is being held in custody
under a commitment issued by the clerk of the district court, without an
order of the district court to that effect based upon a finding that the ac-
cused has violated the order of the court made with reference to the pay-
ment of money at the times and at the place designated in the order, it is
held; that the imprisonment of the petitioner is unlawful and she is en-
titled to be discharged from custody.




In First National Bank and Trust Company of Fargo, a Corporation,
Peti., v. Fred J. Krogh and Hon. M. J. Englert, Judge of the District Court,
Respts.
That Section 6, Chapter 165, Session Laws N. D. 1939, gives to the court,
power to revise and alter the terms of an order extending the period of re-
demption.
That an order to show cause is in effect a notice of motion and a citation
to appear at a stated time and place to show cause why a motion should not
be granted.
That the power of the court to grant an extension of the period of re-
demption under Chapter 165, Session Laws N. D. 1939, is purely statutory, and
the statute does not confer upon the court authority to extend the period of
redemption without a hearing.
That after a period of redemption has expired and the title vested in the
holder of the certificate of sale, the court is without power to further extend
the period of redemption under the provisions of Chapter 165, Session Laws
N. D. 1939.
Review by Writ of Certiorari of proceedings had in the District Court of
Cass County, North Dakota, under Chapter 165, Session Laws of North Da-
kota for 1939, before Hon. M. J. Englert, Judge.
REVERSED.
Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In E. N. Olson, D. D. Riley, et al, Pltf. and Applts. v. E. A. Donnelly,
H. J. Yuly, E. G. Pierson, et al., Defts. and Respts.
That where a proceeding or action is brought in the district court of a
county in this state and a district judge from another judicial district is called
to hear and determine the issue and orders judgment thereon, the judgment
entered is the judgment of the district court in which this judge sits, and not
of the district court of any county within his own judicial district.
That a judgment rendered by a court of general jurisdiction, having jur-
isdiction of the parties and subject-matter, imports absolute verity. As long
as it stands, it can not be attacked collaterally by any of the parties thereto,
or those in privity with them; and as long as it remains in force, neither party
can maintain an action against the judgment on the ground that the judg-
ment was obtained by fraud and deception. Tuttle v. Tuttle, 48 N. D. 10, 181
N. W. 888 followed.
That the county commissioners of a county have charge of the fiscal
matters of the county, and as such are managers of a County Fair established
by the county; and any judgment rendered in an action or proceeding
brought by them is binding upon the taxpayers of the county unless set aside
or reversed on a motion or in some proceeding in that case.
Appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, Hon. P. G.
Swenson, Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, J.
